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ESTATE PLANNING AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
JOHN W. ESTER*
EUGENE F. SCOLES**
Because of the ease with which people and property move from
one state to another and the fact that a client may conduct his affairs
with little regard for state lines, an estate planner must be acutely
aware of conflict of laws problems. Unfortunately, the result of poor
conflict of laws planning may be substantial distortion of the testator's
expressed intent or unnecessary depletion of assets which would other-
wise be available for the objects of the testator's bounty. It is normally
impossible to completely avoid such possibilities. However, as our
society has become progressively more ambulatory, the courts have
realized that inflexible or ethnocentric conflict of laws rules are fre-
quently inadequate to cope with the multitude of problems which may
arise when an estate has contacts with more than one jurisdiction. In
many instances, traditional conflicts notions have been modified so as
to provide sufficient flexibility to enable the forum to select a favorable
law, thereby reducing the possibility of frustrating the testator's
obvious intent because of an arbitrary conflict of laws rule. As a result,
an estate planner is given a significant degree of control over conflicts
problems, and the primary purpose of this article shall be to select a
sampling of areas where such control might be effective.
TRUSTS
Since an inter vivos trust of movables is obviously a conveyance of
property, the courts might limit themselves to the conflict of laws rules
normally applied in regard to inter vivos transfers of movables. 1 How-
ever, because of the force of the policy recognizing the settlor's intent
as controlling in most matters, the conflict of laws rules relating to
trusts have developed to the point where the validity of an inter vivos
trust of movables may be governed by the law of the state designated
in the trust instrument, unless the law selected violates some strong
public policy at the situs.2 If there is no law designated in the instru-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
** Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
1 See, e.g., Warner v. Florida Bank & Trust Co., 160 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1947);
Miller v. Douglass, 192 Wis. 486, 213 N.W. 320 (1927) ; Restatement (Second), Conflict
of Laws § 254a (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959) [hereinafter cited as Restatement].
2 In re Bliss' Trust, 26 Misc. 2d 969, 208 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Shannon v.
Irving Trust Co., 275 N.Y. 95, 9 N.E.2d 792 (1937); Hutchinson v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381,
187 N.E. 65 (1933); First-Central Trust Co. v. Claflin, 49 Ohio L. Abs. 29, 73 N.E.2d
388 (C.P. 1947).
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ment or the settlor's intent is not clear, then the law of the state most
closely connected with the trust is normally applied. The "contacts"
looked for appear to be: the place where the trust is to be administered,
the trustee's place of business, the situs of trust assets, the place where
the trust instrument was executed, and the domicile of the parties.3
The recent pattern of conflicts litigation in this area is reflected by
the Delaware case of Lewis v. Hanson.4 In this case the settlor, while
a resident of Pennsylvania, executed a trust agreement and delivered
certain securities to a trust company in Delaware. The trustee was
directed to administer the trust and pay income to the settlor and then
to distribute the property as the settlor should appoint by will. In
holding that the circumstances indicated the settlor intended to have
the trust administered and governed according to the law of Delaware,
the court stated: "In determining the situs of a trust for the purpose
of deciding what law is applicable to determine its validity, the most
important facts to be considered are the intention of the creator of the
trust, the domicile of the trustee, and the place in which the trust is
administered."5 While the court should and did give primary weight to
the settlor's intent, it must be added that the settlor probably does not
have complete autonomy in the matter of selecting the governing law;
the law chosen should have some reasonable connection with the trust
transaction.6
This apparent desire on the part of the courts to fashion conflict of
laws rules so as to sustain trusts if possible has brought to the area of
testamentary trusts of movables nearly the same flexibility that exists
concerning inter vivos trusts. Since a testamentary trust must fail if
the will creating it is denied probate because of defects relating to the
instrument as a whole, it might be argued that the law governing the
will should also govern the trust it creates.7 Nevertheless, there is a
marked tendency toward testing the validity of a testamentary trust of
movables separately from the validity of the will itself, and it has been
held that matters affecting only the validity of trust provisions, unless
invalid according to some strong public policy in the state of the testa-
3 Stetson v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 22 Conn. Supp. 158, 164 A.2d 239 (Super.
Ct. 1960); Kitchen v. New York Trust Co., 292 Ky. 706, 168 S.W.2d 5 (1943);
Restatement § 294.
4 36 Del. Ch. 235, 128 A.2d 819 (Sup. Ct. 1957), aff'd, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
5 Lewis v. Hanson, supra note 4, at 245, 128 A.2d at 826.
0 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cheek, 202 Misc. 303, 110 N.Y.S.2d 434 (Sup. Ct.
1952) ; Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., supra note 2.
7 To the effect that this was the common-law rule, see Whitney v. Dodge, 105 Cal.
192, 38 Pac. 636 (1894) ; Hussey v. Sargent, 116 Ky. 53, 75 S.W. 211 (1903) ; Stumberg,
Conflict of Laws 431 (2d ed. 1951); Cavers, "Trusts Inter Vivos and the Conflict of
Laws," 44 Harv. L. Rev. 161 (1930).
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tor's domicile at death, should be resolved by the law of the state
designated in the will.8 If there is no expression of intent in the will,
the court might apply either the law of the state of testator's domicile
at death or that of the state where the trust is to be administered,
whichever makes the trust valid.' The significance of these rules lies
in the fact that the testator's intention is relied on to sustain the trust.
Consequently, the draftsman of either an inter vivos or testamentary
trust of movables should include a provision expressly selecting the
governing law from among those states having some reasonable con-
nection with the trust.10 It is, of course, the estate planner's responsi-
bility to see that the law so chosen is favorable to his client's trust
scheme.
When an inter vivos or testamentary trust of immovables is in-
volved, the settlor's intent concerning selection of law is given less
weight and the courts continue to adhere to the traditional choice of
law rule for immovables, referring most questions to the law of the
situs."1 Even though the situs rule does significantly reduce the effect
to be given to the settlor's intent, there appears to be at least one
device whereby he may partially control the selection of governing law.
If the trust instrument contains a direction to sell the land and reinvest
in movables, and according to the law of the situs the land was equi-
tably converted into movable property, the situs might apply the
choice of law rule for trusts of movables. Thus, while the situs law
controls the issue of equitable conversion, the validity of the particular
trust terms under the rule against perpetuities or a rule restricting ac-
cumulation of income may be tested by nonsitus law.2 By taking ad-
vantage of these rules concerning equitable conversion, an estate
planner might in some degree give effect to his client's intent that non-
situs law should be applied.
POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
The validity of a power of appointment is essentially an issue
relating to the transaction creating the power, and therefore, validity
8 Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Trust Co., 250 Ill. 86, 95 N.E. 59
(1911); National Shawmut Bank v. Cumming, 325 Mass. 457, 91 N.E.2d 337 (1950);
Lozier v. Lozier, 99 Ohio St. 254, 124 N.E. 167 (1919) (semble); Matter of Chappell,
124 Wash. 128, 213 Pac. 684 (1923).
9 Compare Hope v. Brewer, 136 N.Y. 126, 32 N.E. 558 (1892), with Cross v. United
States Trust Co., 131 N.Y. 330, 30 N.E. 125 (1892).
1D For examples of how such a clause might be worded, see Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees § 1053, at 131, § 1197 (1955) ; Land, Trusts in the Conflict of Laws 121 (1940).
11 See, e.g., Acker v. Priest, 92 Iowa 610, 61 N.W. 235 (1894); Toledo Soc'y for
Crippled Children v. Hickok, 152 Tex. 578, 261 S.W.2d 692 (1953).
12 Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900); In re Norton's Estate, 7 Misc. 2d 342,
155 N.Y.S.2d 838 (Surr. Ct. 1956) ; Land, op. cit. supra note 10, at 29-34.
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is generally determined by the law which is applied to the transaction
as a whole. For example, the law which is used to test the validity of
an inter vivos or testamentary trust of movables controls both the
validity of the trust and any power of appointment created in the trust
instrument.' 3 Since the validity of both the trust and the power of
appointment are so closely interrelated, recent cases have given the
same weight to the donor's selection of governing law as is given to the
settlor's expression of intent in cases involving trusts.14 If a power of
appointment is not included in a trust, validity is normally resolved by
the rules controlling the creation of other interests in property. This
means that the law of the situs of land determines the validity of a
power created by inter vivos instrument or by will.' 5 In the case of
movables, the situs would likewise control powers created by inter vivos
transactions, while the domicile of the testator seems to control powers
of appointment created by will.' 6
In regard to the exercise of a power of appointment, the courts
usually hold that the power to appoint an interest in land, either by
will or inter vivos, can be exercised only by an instrument which is
valid and effective for that purpose according to the law of the situsYm
Thus, the issue as to whether a power over land has been exercised by
a general devise which does not mention the power, is determined by
the law of the state where the land is located.18
The choice of law rule concerning the validity and effect of an
exercise of a power of appointment in movables is not so well-settled.
According to the traditional rule, the forum should refer to the law of
the donor's domicile.' 9 However, current decisions have stressed the
13 Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Prindle, 290 Mass. 577, 195 N.E. 793 (1935);
Leflar, Conflict of Laws § 190 (1959); Restatement §§ 234, 294, comment g, 295,
comment g.
14 See, e.g., Lewis v. Hanson, supra note 4; Amerige v. Attorney Gen., 324 Mass.
648, 88 N.E.2d 126 (1949).
15 Callwood v. Virgin Islands Nat'l Bank, 221 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1955); Durand &
Herterich, "Conflict of Laws and the Exercise of Powers of Appointment," 42 Cornell
L.Q. 185 (1957).
16 Cf. Restatement §§ 282, 283, 295.
17 Security Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Ward, 10 Del. Ch. 408, 93 Atl. 385 (1915);
Ligget v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 274 Ky. 387, 118 S.W.2d 720 (1938); Amerige
v. Attorney Gen., supra note 14; Land, op. cit. supra note 10, at 34-36.
18 Art Students' League v. Hinkley, 31 F.2d 469 (D. Md. 1929), aff'd, 37 F.2d 224
(4th Cir. 1930); In re Kelly's Will, 174 Misc. 80, 20 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
19 Pitman v. Pitman, 314 Mass. 465, 50 N.E.2d 69 (1943); David v. Atlantic County
S.P.C.A., 129 N.J. Eq. 501, 19 A.2d 896 (ch. 1941); Adams v. D'Hauteville, 72 R.I. 325,
51 A.2d 92 (1947). For a discussion of the variations of the traditional rule, see Durand
& Herterich, supra note 15; Mulford, "The Conflict of Laws and Powers of Appoint-
ment," 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 403 (1939).
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relationship between powers of appointment and trusts. In the case
of In re Pratt's Trust,20 a resident of Nevada created an inter vivos
trust of movables in New York, appointed a New York trustee, and
retained a general testamentary power to appoint the corpus. The set-
tlor subsequently became a Florida domiciliary and died a few days
after executing a will which exercised the power partially in favor of
charities. Under the law of Florida, a bequest to a charity in a will
executed so shortly before the testator's death is invalid, while in New
York such bequests were unaffected by statute. On the question of
distribution of the trust corpus in New York, the New York court held
that an express choice of law clause, which provided that the trust
should be governed by New York law, applied to both the trust and the
exercise of the power of appointment. As a consequence, the will con-
stituted a valid appointment of the corpus having a situs in New York.
The argument for separating the trust questions from the problem of
testamentary exercise of the power was specifically urged, but both
New York appellate courts treated the testamentary exercise of the
power as being controlled by the law governing the trust in general.
This case illustrates a trend to identify the validity of an exercise of a
power of appointment with the validity of the trust in which the power
was created, and to permit the law designated by the settlor-donor to
be controlling if that law has some reasonable connection with the
trust and power of appointment.'
WILLS
A semanticist might say that an attorney "planned" an estate if
he intentionally advised intestacy, but the lack of a testamentary
20 5 App. Div. 2d 501, 172 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1958), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 855, 203 N.Y.S.2d 906
(1960).
21 Accord, Lewis v. Hanson, supra note 4; Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington
Trust Co., 26 Del. Ch. 397, 24 A.2d 309 (1942); In re Bauer's Trust, 13 App. Div. 2d
369, 216 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1961); First-Central Trust Co. v. Claflin, supra note 2. If the
settlor-donor expresses no intent concerning the law to be applied, the court might look
for the law most closely connected with the trust creating the power of appointment.
For example, in Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Huntington, 149 Conn. 331, 179 A.2d 604
(1962), the testator died a domiciliary of Connecticut, having executed a will which did
not exercise his power of appointment according to the law of Connecticut. The trust
which gave the testator the power to appoint the movable corpus was created in New
York, a New York trustee was appointed, and the situs of the trust corpus was in New
York. According to New York law, the testator's will did exercise his power, although
the exercise was partially invalid under the New York rule against perpetuities. The
Connecticut court concluded that a prior New York holding that the testator exercised
the power was binding in Connecticut. The court stressed the facts that the trust corpus
was located and administered in New York and all interested parties appeared in the
prior New York litigation. See also Restatement § 299b.
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instrument almost always indicates the absence of any estate plan.
For this reason, conflict of laws problems relating to intestacy are
beyond the scope of this study and should be disposed of in a summary
fashion. According to the prevailing views, devolution of immovables
is governed by the internal and conflict of laws rules of the situs,22
and movables are distributed according to the law of the decedent's
domicile at the time of death.13 While there have been few deviations
from these general rules,24 it has been argued that intestate distribu-
tion of tangible personal property is in fact controlled by the law of the
situs, and the situs refers to the law of the decedent's domicile as a
matter of "convenience." 2 The ultimate power of the situs to control
distribution of intestate tangible personalty is best illustrated by the
cases holding that such property escheats to the state where it is located
and not to the state of the decedent's domicile.26
The common-law conflict of laws rules for testate succession are
analogous to those dealing with intestate succession: (i) The validity
and effect of a testamentary gift of an immovable is tested by the
internal and conflict of laws rules of the situs,217 and (ii) the validity
and effect of a bequest of movable property is governed by the law of
the testator's domicile at the time of death." Since these rules have
been hallowed by continuous repetition, the following materials are
designed to delineate the extent to which they are actually applied.
Execution of Wills
Although testamentary capacity might be characterized as an issue
of status and resolved according to the law of the testator's domicile at
22 In re Estate of Gray, 168 F. Supp. 124 (D.D.C. 1958); Estate of Drumheller v.
Terry, 252 Iowa 1378, 110 N.W.2d 833 (1961); White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790, 8
S.E. 596 (1888) ; Dicey, Conflict of Laws 59 (6th ed. 1949) ; Stimson, "Conflict of Laws
and the Administration of Decedents' Real Estate," 6 Vand. L. Rev. 545 (1953).
23 Ginther v. The American Ranger, 189 F. Supp. 872 (D. Md. 1960); Estate of
Toler v. Workman, 325 S.W.2d 755 (Mo. 1959); Planson v. Scott, 26 Ohio App. 122, 158
N.E. 588 (1927) ; Leflar, op. cit. supra note 13, § 184.
24 The most notable exception is found in a Mississippi statute which provides:
"All personal property situated in this state shall ... be distributed according to the laws
of this state . . .notwithstanding the domicile of the decedent may have been in another
state ...." Miss. Code Ann. § 467 (1956).
25 See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 165 (3d ed. 1949); Stumberg, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 412-13; Restatement § 303.
26 In re Forney's Estate, 43 Nev. 227, 184 Pac. 206 (1919) (semble) ; In re Barnett's
Trusts [19021 1 Ch. 847; Griswold, "Renvoi Revisited," 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1194
(1938). But see California v. Tax Comm'n, 55 Wash. 2d 155, 346 P.2d 1006 (1959) (in-
tangible property held to escheat to the state of the decedent's domicile).
27 See Stimson, supra note 22; Restatement § 249.
28 See Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 25, § 168; Restatement § 306.
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the time his will was executed, the usual conflict of laws situs and domi-
ciliary rules have been applied with apparent uniformity.29 These rules
have also been applied to test compliance with statutory formalities. For
instance, a decree admitting a will to probate at the testator's domicile
need not be given full faith and credit in the state where land is lo-
cated,30 and the situs may refuse to give effect to an attempted disposi-
tion of local land if the instrument does not comply with local require-
ments.31 When movable property is involved, the law of the decedent's
domicile at death has been applied although he was not domiciled in
that jurisdiction when the will was executed.32 These conclusions might
be justified by arguing that the situs of land is the logical forum to re-
solve issues of title and insure proper recordation, and the decedent's
domicile at death provides a convenient unitary reference for solving
problems of succession to movables. But are these conclusions rea-
sonable? The policy underlying internal laws of succession is to give
effect to the testator's intent, subject only to such limitations as the
law might impose. If the testator's intent is clear and he fully complied
with the law of his domicile at the time of execution, why should his
intent be frustrated by inflexible conflict of laws rules?33
Remedial legislation has properly removed the inflexibility in-
herent in the common-law domiciliary and situs rules. At least thirty
states have enacted statutes which permit local probate of a will if
executed in compliance with the law of the place of execution or accord-
ing to the law of the testator's domicile at the time of execution or at
29 See, e.g., Selle v. Rapp, 143 Ark. 192, 220 S.W. 662 (1920); Shaw v. Grimes, 187
Ky. 250, 218 S.W. 447 (1920); Cameron v. Watson, 40 Miss. 191 (1866); Carpenter v.
Bell, 96 Tenn. 294, 34 S.W. 209 (1896).
3o Clarke v. Clarke, supra note 12; Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U.S. 608 (1883);
Trotter v. Van Pelt, 144 Fla. 517, 198 So. 215 (1940).
31 McPherson v. McKay, 207 Ark. 546, 181 S.W.2d 685 (1944); White v. Greenway,
303 Mo. 691, 263 S.W. 104 (1924); Manuel v. Manuel, 13 Ohio St. 458 (1862); Toledo
Soc'y for Crippled Children v. Hickok, supra note 11.
32 Moultrie v. Hunt, 23 N.Y. 394 (1861); In re Beaumont's Estate, 216 Pa. 350,
65 Atl. 799 (1907).
33 Professor Yiannopoulos contends that the domiciliary rule is "not one of those
rules 'deeply embedded' in the common law," and "in a multiple contact case it is actually
the law validating the disposition which governs the formal validity of wills of
movables." Yiannopoulos, "Wills of Movables in American International Conflicts Law:
A Critique of the Domiciliary 'Rule,'" 46 Calif. L. Rev. 185, 193, 203 (1958). Conceding
that there may be more flexibility in the common-law domiciliary rule than most authori-
ties are willing to admit, an early Ohio case did apply the common-law rule and denied
probate although the will was valid according to the law of the place of execution.
Manuel v. Manuel, supra note 31.
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death.34 Following this trend, in 1953 Ohio added a generally similar
provision to section 2107.18 of the Revised Code which states:
The probate court shall admit a will to probate if it appears that
such will was attested and executed according to the law in force at
the time of execution in the state where executed, or according to the
law in force in this state at the time of death, or according to the law
in force in the state where the testator was domiciled at the time of his
death, and if it appears that the testator at the time of executing such
will was of full age, of sound mind and memory, and not under
restraint.
This statute should remedy the problems which Ohio has experi-
enced incident to attempting to accomplish validation through the an-
cillary administration provisions.35 These latter sections primarily were
designed to provide for local ancillary administration after probate else-
where and were held not applicable in the case of a resident leaving a
foreign-executed will.36 They likewise did not change the common-law
conflict rules requiring devises of local land to satisfy Ohio law." Since
1953, validation should result whether in ancillary administration under
section 2129.05 or in original probate under section 2107.18 if the
written will was in fact duly executed by the law of the place of execu-
tion or of the domicile of the testator at death.
Interpretation and Construction of Wills
Interpretation of a will may be defined as "the process of discover-
ing the meaning or intention of the testator," and construction as the
process of assigning legal significance or effect to testamentary language
after its meaning is resolved." Since interpretation is properly a ques-
tion of "fact" which may be resolved without selecting any particular
"law," it has been argued that interpretation gives rise to no true con-
flict of laws problems.3 9 However, once the testator's intent is discov-
ered, or his absence of intent is shown, the court must apply rules
of "construction" to assign legal significance to his expressed or
probable intent. The extent to which the law permits fulfillment of
testamentary intent is clearly a question of substantive law which may
give rise to choice of law problems.
In cases involving immovable property, the construction of a testa-
34 See Scoles, "Conflict of Laws in Estate Planning," 9 U. Fla. L. Rev. 398, 416-17
(1956).
35 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2129.05-.06 (1953).
36 Manuel v. Manuel, supra note 31.
37 Meese v. Keefe, 10 Ohio 362 (1841); Bailey v. Bailey, 8 Ohio 239 (1837).
38 Atkinson, Wills § 146 (2d ed. 1953).
39 Yiannopoulos, supra note 33, at 243.
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mentary expression of intent and the legal effect of failure to clearly
express intent are normally resolved according to the law of the
situs.4 ° If a West Virginia domiciliary provides for his spouse in a will
executed and later probated in that state, an Ohio court will apply Ohio
presumptions to determine whether the testator intended that she
should have dower in Ohio land in addition to taking under the will.41
Likewise, a gift to the testator's children "when they reach majority"
will be given legal effect according to the law of the situsY But based
in large part on the Kansas case of Keith v. Eaton,43 several jurisdic-
tions have resolved problems of construction according to the law of the
testator's domicile.44 These cases reason that the testator's intent was
unitary and not dependent upon the law of each jurisdiction where
land might be located, and since the testator was most familiar with the
law of his domicile he presumably intended a construction in accord
with that law. Although this approach is superficially reasonable, if the
issue is the legal effect of words in creating or defining interests in land,
the forum should properly refer to the law of the jurisdiction where the
land is located."
40 See, e.g., Bowen v. Frank, 179 Ark. 1004, 18 S.W.2d 1037 (1929); Peet v. Peet,
229 11. 341, &2 N.E. 376 (1907) ; Scofield v. Hadden, 206 Iowa 597, 220 N.W. 1 (1928) ;
Thompson v. Penn, 149 Ky. 158, 148 S.W. 33 (1912); Brewster v. Benedict, 14 Ohio 368
(1846) (semble). Although the courts often speak of interpretation and construction as
though they mean the same thing, Professor Beale recognizes the distinction and maintains
that the former is governed by the law of the testator's domicile and the latter by the
law of the situs. 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws §§ 251.1-.3 (1935). The cases of In re Germon's
Estate, 35 Misc. 2d 12, 226 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Surr. Ct. 1962), and In re Gallagher's Estate,
10 Misc. 2d 422, 169 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Surr. Ct. 1957), appear to support this thesis. How-
ever, any "conflict" arising in the process of interpretation is not properly a conflict of
laws. When interpreting the factual meaning of testamentary language, the forum should
consider surrounding circumstances, including the meaning attached to words according
to the usage prevailing in the testator's domicile at the time the will was drafted. But
this does not involve choice of law; it is simply a matter of resolving factual meaning
according to relevant circumstances.
41 Jennings v. Jennings, 21 Ohio St. 56 (1871).
42 Craighead v. Pike, 5 Ohio Dec. Reprint 273 (Cincinnati Super. Ct. 1875), dis-
cussed in Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 7, at 421.
- 43 58 Kan. 732, 51 Pac. 271 (1897).
44 See Higinbotham v. Manchester, 113 Conn. 62, 154 AtI. 242 (1931); Houghton
v. Hughes, 108 Me. 233, 79 Atl. 909 (1911); Martin v. Eslick, 229 Miss. 234, 90 So. 2d
635 (1956); Zombro v. Moffett, 329 Mo. 137, 44 S.W.2d 149 (1931).
45 Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 7, at 421; Stimson, supra note 22. The Restatement
(Second) attempts to harmonize the situs and domicile rules in the following manner:
Authority is nearly equally divided as to whether in situations where there is no satisfac-
tory evidence of the testator's intentions, the meaning of the words in question should be
determined according to usage in the state where the testator was domiciled at the time
the will was executed, or according to usage prevailing at the situs of the land. If in a
given case, the courts of the situs would look to their own local usage to determine the
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Choice of law problems relating to the construction of wills dispos-
ing of movables are not as easily resolved as those relating to testa-
mentary dispositions of land. Assume that the testator was domiciled
in Virginia when he executed a will in Indiana, and he died domiciled in
Illinois. An Ohio court called upon to construe the legal effect of words
disposing of movables having a situs in Ohio might reasonably refer to
the law of any of the four states mentioned. Fortunately, the courts are
willing to give effect to an express or implied testamentary direction
concerning choice of law,46 and it is wise to include such a clause when-
ever an estate has multistate contacts. In the absence of such a provi-
sion, the prevailing rule calls for application of the law of the testator's
domicile,4 7 but the cases are not clear as to whether reference should be
made to the law of the testator's domicile at the time the will was
executed or at the time of his death. The few cases in point seem to
express a preference for the former,48 arguing that the testator probably
would have intended a construction according to the law of his domicile
at the time the will was drafted, particularly in cases where his subse-
quent change of domicile was not anticipated.
Protection of the Surviving Spouse49
Freedom of testamentary disposition is limited in all states by
statutes or case law designed to protect the testator's surviving spouseY0
Such protection may take the form of common-law dower, forced heir-
ship, homestead, allowance for support pending probate, or other simi-
meaning of the words used in the devise, the forum will do likewise. If, on the other
hand, the situs courts would look to usage in the state of the testator's domicil, the forum
will again do the same. It is particularly likely that the situs courts would adopt the
latter alternative in situations where land in two or more states is covered by a single
devise. This is because the testator presumably intended the words to bear a single
meaning and not mean perhaps as many different things as there are states in which there
is land covered by the devise. See Restatement § 214, comment d, § 251, comment b.
46 See Harrison v. Nbxon, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 315 (1835) ; Lozier v. Lozier, supra note
8; Smith v. Mercantile Trust Co., 199 Md. 264, 86 A.2d 504 (1952) (dicta); Second
Bank-State Street Trust Co. v. Weston, 342 Mass. 630, 174 N.E.2d 763 (Mass. 1961).
47 Second Bank-State Street Trust Co. v. Weston, supra note 46; In re Sewart's
Estate, 342 Mich. 491, 70 N.W.2d 732 (1955) ; Lozier v. Lozier, supra note 8; Skinner v.
Brunsen, 59 R.I. 159, 32 A.2d 263 (1943).
48 Staigg v. Atkinson, 144 Mass. 564, 12 N.E. 354 (1887); Houghton v. Hughes,
supra note 44; Estate of Pleasonton, 45 N.J. Super. 154, 131 A.2d 795 (1957). Cf.
Restatement § 308.
49 Protection of the surviving spouse was selected for discussion from among a
number of possible statutory limitations on freedom of testamentary disposition.
60 Leach, Cases on Wills 16-19 (2d ed. 1960); 3 Vernier, American Family Laws §§
189, 205, 216, 228 (1935); Breslauer, "Conflict of Laws in Restrictions on Freedom of
Testation," 27 Iowa L. Rev. 425 (1942) ; Scoles and Rheinstein, "Conflict Avoidance in
Succession Planning," 21 Law and Contemp. Prob. 499, 506 (1956).
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lar provisions. Since protection of some sort is provided for in all
states, but applicable statutes vary greatly in scope and detail, conflict
of laws rules normally determine the degree of protection available to a
surviving spouse in cases where the testator left property having a situs
in more than one state. The Restatement of Conflicts offers a decep-
tively simple solution: The interests of a surviving spouse in land owned
by the testator are determined by the law of the state where the
land is located,5' and claims against personal property are governed by
the law of the testator's domicile.52 These rules are mechanically easy
to apply and do frequently afford the surviving spouse with adequate
protection, but mechanical application should be avoided because they
do not necessarily further the interests of the state having predominant
contact with support and maintenance for the surviving spouse.
When the surviving spouse claims an interest in land, either in ad-
dition to or in lieu of testamentary gifts, the cases support the position
taken by the Restatement and refer such questions to the law of the
situs. 53 Justification for this rule may be based on the fact that credi-
tors or heirs claiming a right against the land normally seek satisfaction
in the state where the land is located, and therefore, that state has pre-
dominant contact with the degree of protection which should be afforded
against such claims. On the other hand, it is frequently difficult to
justify the rule requiring application of the law of the testator's domi-
cile in cases where the surviving spouse claims an interest in movable
property. The testator's "legal" domicile at death is not necessarily
the state where the surviving spouse resides, nor is it necessarily the
state where movable property is located. In the case of In re McComb's
Estate5 4 the testator and his widow were legally "domiciled" in Texas
at the time of his death, but both parties had in fact "resided" in Ohio
for a number of years and the bulk of the testator's movable property
had a situs in Ohio. Ohio was therefore the state having predominant
contact with securing adequate support and maintenance for the widow,
51 Restatement §§ 248(1), 253. California by statute applies the law of the domicile
of a nonresident to elective shares in both movables and immovables. The problems
peculiar to estates having some contact with California are ably discussed in Able, Barry,
Halsted and Marsh, "Rights of a Surviving Spouse in Property Acquired by Decedent
While Domiciled Outside of California," 47 Calif. L. Rev. 211 (1959).
52 Restatement § 301.
53 In re Graham's Estate, 73 Ariz. 179, 239 P.2d 365 (1951) (homestead); Mayo v.
Arkansas Valley Trust Co., 132 Ark. 64, 200 S.W. 505 (1917) (necessity of filing a petition
for assignment of dower in order to claim rents from Ohio land, governed by Ohio law) ;
Hussa v. Hussa, 65 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1953) (homestead) ; Sinclair v. Sinclair, 99 N.H. 316,
109 A.2d 851 (1954) (widow's statutory share); Jennings v. Jennings, supra note 41
(right of surviving spouse to take against the testator's will and claim dower).
54 52 Ohio L. Abs. 353, 80 N.E.2d 573 (P. Ct. 1948).
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and based on a construction of Ohio legislation, the court applied Ohio
law and granted her a year's allowance for support out of Ohio per-
sonal propertyY Even in the absence of any statute susceptible to such
a conclusion, it has been argued that the courts in fact apply the law
of the state which will grant protection to the surviving spouseY6 Such
flexibility is desirable if we assume that the courts should effectuate a
policy of protecting the surviving spouse notwithstanding the testator's
intent to the contrary.
TAXATION
Double Taxation
Justice Holmes was of the opinion that there is no federal consti-
tutional prohibition against taxation of the same property by more than
one stateY Our problem is: To what extent has his opinion become
law?
The courts have held that death taxes may be imposed on land
Gr In 1953, Ohio Rev. Code § 2117.23 was amended so as to broaden the statute and
facilitate the granting of a year's allowance in cases where the decedent was a nonresident.
Compare In re McCombs' Estate, supra note 54, with Estate of Weatherhead, 73 Ohio
L. Abs. 524, 137 N.E.2d 315 (P. Ct. 1956). Assuming that an allowance is granted under
this statute, what effect will such an award be given in the state of the decedent's domi-
cile? In Mann v. Peoples-Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 256 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1953), an Ohio
court granted a year's allowance to a widow residing in Kentucky and charged the
allowance against the decedent's Ohio land. The Kentucky court held that the Ohio
allowance should not be deducted from the share which the widow ultimately received.
However, in Keyser's Estate, 87 Pittsb. Leg. J. (n.s.) 289, 36 Pa. D. & C. 515 (Allegheny
County Orphang' Ct. 1939), the widow of a Pennsylvania domiciliary had received a
year's allowance from assets in Ohio, and the Pennsylvania court held that she could
make no additional claim for allowance in Pennsylvania unless the Ohio allowance was
less than that available under Pennsylvania law. The problem involved in such cases is
primarily one of statutory construction, and the statutes and cases in the state of the
decedent's domicile should be investigated before advising a nonresident widow to claim
an allowance out of Ohio assets. To the effect that a nonresident surviving spouse may
claim Ohio property exempt from probate, see In re Estate of Mitchell, 97 Ohio App.
443, 127 N.E.2d 39 (1954) ; Estate of Weatherhead, supra.
GG Yiannopoulos, supra note 33, at 220, 225. A striking example of Professor
Yiannopoulos' thesis is provided by the case of Estate of Gould, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 289,
140 N.E.2d 793 (P. Ct. 1956). In this case, the testatrix and her husband were domiciled
in Bermuda, but testatrix owned substantial personal property having a situs in Ohio.
According to the law of Bermuda, a surviving spouse had no right to renounce a will
and receive an intestate share. The Ohio court applied Ohio law and permitted the sur-
viving husband to renounce the will and receive his intestate share of Ohio personal
property. The court partially justified its conclusion by arguing that the will had not
been offered for probate in Bermuda, thus permitting the administrator to proceed with
probate in Ohio as though testatrix had resided in Ohio at the time of her death.
57 See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 211 (1905)
(dissenting opinion); Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189 (1903).
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only at the situs, thereby precluding the possibility of double taxation.58
A similar rule exists as to tangible personal property if it has a "per-
manent" location. In Frick v. Pennsylvania,9 Pennsylvania imposed a
death transfer tax on a domiciliary's tangible personal property, a por-
tion of which was permanently located in New York and Massachu-
setts. The Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the situs to tax
such property is "not partial but plenary," and concluded that the
Pennsylvania tax violated the fourteenth amendment in so far as it was
imposed on personal property permanently located in other states."0
Permanency of location thus appears to be the basic contact between
tangible personal property and a constitutional tax situs.
Attempts to locate the tax situs of intangible property have resulted
in the construction of judicial labyrinths to justify the conclusion that
double taxation is constitutional in certain cases. For example, New
Jersey and Pennsylvania may agree that a decedent can be domiciled
in only one state and death taxes may be assessed on his intangibles
only by the state of his domicile."' However, the location of the de-
cedent's domicile is a factual issue, and New Jersey may conclude that
the decedent was domiciled there notwithstanding Pennsylvania's pre-
vious holding that his only domicile was in Pennsylvania. 2 Because
the decedent's "only" domicile was in two states, the practical result
is taxation of the same intangibles by both states. The Supreme Court
has sustained the constitutionality of such double taxation by arguing
that there is no constitutional provision which requires uniform con-
clusions concerning the location of a decedent's domicile. 3
Justice Holmes' opinion has also been accepted in cases where
intangible property has overlapping tax bases. If the subject of tax-
ation is the intangible corpus of an inter vivos trust, the trustee's domi-
58 Cf. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1 (1928); Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525
(1919) ; Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra note 57, at 204 (dicta).
59 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
60 Accord, Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949); City Bank Farmers Trust
Co. v. Schnader, 293 U.S. 112 (1934) ; Leflar, Conflict of Laws § 214 (1959).
61 The hypothetical discussed in the text is based on the now-classic Dorrance litiga-
tion. Dorrance v. Thayer-Martin, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 AtI. 601 (Prerog. Ct. 1934),
aff'd, 13 N.J. Misc. 168, 176 AUt. 902 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 116 N.J.L. 362, 184 AtI. 743
(E. & A. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 678 (1936); Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393 (1935);
Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 AtI. 303 (1932).
62 Ibid. See also Guterman, "Avoidance of Double Death Taxation of Estates and
Trusts," 95 U. Pa. L. Rev. 701 (1947); Tweed & Sargent, "Death and Taxes Are
Certain-But What of Domicile," 53 Harv. L. Rev. 68 (1939).
63 Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 299 (1937). See Clark, "A
State's Tax Jurisdiction as Limited by the United States Constitution," 13 U. Fla. L.
Rev. 401, 432-34 (1960).
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cile may tax his property interest 4 and the beneficial interest may be
taxed in the state of the beneficiary's domicile.6" In regard to death
taxes, the Supreme Court has permitted the decedent-settlor's domicile
to tax the intangible corpus of a foreign trust, at the same time recog-
nizing the validity of a tax assessed in the state where the trustee was
domiciled and the trust administered.66 The Supreme Court has also
sustained a death tax imposed by Utah on shares in a Utah corpora-
tion, although the same shares were previously taxed in New York
where the decedent was domiciled.
7
The labyrinth of double taxation is further confused by asking the
question: What is "intangible" personal property? Blodgett v. Silber-
man68 provides the best thumbnail sketch of the Supreme Court's ap-
proach to the problem of characterization. The Court held: (i) Based
on New York internal law, the decedent's interest in a New York part-
nership was "intangible," and therefore, New York land owned by the
partnership was subject to taxation in Connecticut where the decedent
was domiciled; (ii) Connecticut's characterization of United States
bonds as "tangible" was incorrect; bonds are "intangible" and may be
taxed by the decedent's domicile; and (iii) The decedent's savings
account in a New York bank was an "intangible" asset and subject to
death taxes in Connecticut, although cash in a New York safe deposit
box was "tangible" and taxable only at the situs.69
By combining the holdings in each of the cases discussed above, it
appears that an estate planner should ask the following questions:
Is the property involved "tangible" or "intangible"? If characterized
as tangible, where is its "permanent" location? If characterized as in-
tangible, does the property or its owner have contacts with more than
one state, thus opening the door for double situs and double domicile?
If the answers to these questions lead to a conclusion of double taxation,
some relief might be available in those states which have enacted re-
ciprocal and nonresident exemption statutes.70 Since these statutes do
64 Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486 (1947).
65 Commonwealth v. Stewart, 338 Pa. 9, 12 A.2d 444 (1940), aff'd sub nom., Stewart
v. Pennsylvania, 312 U.S. 649 (1941).
6G Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939) ; Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383 (1939);
Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 (1916). See also Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657
(1942).
67 Commissioner v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
68 Supra note 58.
69 Accord, Thomas v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 443 (1960). The facts in this case are
reported in Fiduciary Decisions, 100 Trusts & Estates 158 (1961).
70 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 198.44 (1958) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 375 (1959) ; Ohio
Rev. Code § 5731.10 (1953).
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not insure complete freedom from double taxation,71 an estate planner
should advise his client to locate assets so as to force taxing states into
the courts of a single state for the satisfaction of their claims. If litiga-
tion can be forced into a common tribunal, each state submitting a
tax claim will be bound by the findings of that court.
72
Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes
Congress has specifically provided for apportionment of federal
estate taxes on life insurance proceeds and appointive property,7 3 but
there is no federal statute indicating which beneficiaries must bear the
burden of federal taxes on other property. Due to the fact that Con-
gress has not occupied the entire field, allocation of federal inheritance
taxes is governed by state law. 4 According to the common-law rule, it
is presumed that inheritance taxes are a charge on residuary assets.75
If this presumption is not rebutted, the result may be substantial frus-
tration of the testator's probable intent, particularly in cases where the
residue is left to his spouse or children. To alleviate this potential in-
equity, about half of the states have abandoned the common-law rule,
either by statute76 or case law,77 and estate taxes are prorated among
beneficiaries unless the testator indicates a contrary intent. The source
of potential conflict of laws litigation is obvious: Which law governs if
the decedent was domiciled in State X where apportionment is required
and he owned property having a situs in State Y where the common-law
presumption is applied?
It might be argued that the forum should apply the law of the
state which controls succession, e.g., the law of the situs of land should
determine whether the devisee must contribute toward payment of fed-
eral estate taxes. However, the courts have shown little desire to har-
71 Marsh, "Multiple Death Taxation in the United States," 8 U.C.LA.L. Rev. 69
(1961).
72 In re Benjamin's Estate, 289 N.Y. 554, 43 N.E.2d 531 (1942) ; Matter of Trow-
bridge, 266 N.Y. 283, 194 N.E. 756 (1935).
7-3 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2206, 2207.
74 Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1952); Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Huntington,
149 Conn. 331, 179 A.2d 604 (1962).
75 First Nat'l Bank v. Hart, 383 Ill. 489, 50 N.E.2d 461 (1943); Gelin v. Gelin, 229
Minn. 516, 40 N.W.2d 342 (1949). See Sutter, "Apportionment of the Federal Estate
Tax in the Absence of Statute or an Expression of Intention," 51 Mich. L. Rev. 53 (1952).
76 See, e.g., Cal. Prob. Code §§ 970-77; N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 124; Pa. Stat. Ann.
fit. 20, §§ 881-87 (Supp. 1961). See Scoles & Stephens, "The Proposed Uniform Estate
Tax Apportionment Act," 43 Minn. L. Rev. 907 (1959).
77 Pearcy v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 121 Ind. App. 136, 96 N.E.2d 918 (1951);
In re Gallager's Will, 57 N.M. 112, 255 P.2d 317 (1953); McDougall v. Central Nat'l
Bank, 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952), explained in Campbell v. Lloyd, 162 Ohio
St. 203, 122 N.E.2d 695 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 911 (1955).
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monize the rules relating to succession and apportionment of death
taxes. A series of New York cases have held that the issue of appor-
tionment should be controlled by the law of the decedent's domicile at
the time of death.71 This rule has been applied whether the testa-
mentary donee receives movable or immovable property, and whether
immovable property is located in the forum or elsewhere.79
The New York domicile rule has met with greatest resistance in
cases involving nonprobate assets which are nevertheless includible in
the decedent's gross estate for federal inheritance tax purposes. In
Isaacson v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,80 the decedent created
an inter vivos trust in Massachusetts while domiciled in that state. He
later moved and was domiciled in Maine at the time of his death. The
Massachusetts court concluded that a local trust was involved, and the
issue of apportionment of federal estate taxes was resolved by applying
Massachusetts law rather than the law of the decedent-settlor's domi-
cile at the time of his death."' The fact that the inter vivos trust fund
was included in the decedent's gross estate for federal tax purposes was
held to be an insufficient contact with Maine to warrant application of
its law. The Massachusetts rule appeals to logic by correlating the
choice of law rule for apportionment with the traditional conflicts rules
concerning inter vivos trusts. However, it has been suggested that the
New York domicile rule is preferable regardless of its inconsistency
with other conflict of laws rules.8 2 If an estate planner can accurately
predict who will ultimately share in the payment of federal inheritance
taxes, he can arrange a testamentary scheme which is consistent with
his client's wishes. To facilitate accurate prediction and uniformity,
the courts should select the law of a single state to control the alloca-
tion of payment of federal inheritance taxes. The domicile reference
"brings about the desirable result of uniform treatment..., for regard-
less of the situs of the property there is a single point of reference
-- decedent's domicile."8 3
Federal legislation is the obvious solution to the problems involved,
and the present tendency toward multistate location of assets should
78 See, e.g., In re Huntington's Trust, 14 App. Div. 2d 312, 220 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1961) ;
In re Royse's Estate, 118 N.Y.S.2d 421 (Surr. Ct. 1952); In re Peabody's Estate, 115
N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct. 1952). Accord, Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Huntington, supra
note 74 (semble) ; Trust Co. v. Nichols, 62 N.J. Super. 495, 163 A.2d 205 (1960).
79 See, e.g., In re Royse's Estate, supra note 78.
80 325 Mass. 469, 91 N.E.2d 334 (1950).
81 Accord, Knowles v. National Bank, 345 Mich. 671, 76 N.W.2d 813 (1956)
(semble); First Nat'l Bank v. First Trust Co., 242 Minn. 226, 64 N.W.2d 524 (1954).
82 Scoles, "Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes and Conflict of Laws," 55
Colum. L. Rev. 261, 280 (1955).
83 Doetsch v. Doetsch, 312 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1963).
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eventually evoke congressional action. To counteract the present lack
of federal legislation, a "Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act" has
been proposed . 4 Although uniform state legislation is clearly desirable,
the proposed act has been criticized for its failure to adequately resolve
conflict of laws problems.85 Fortunately, estate planners need not wait
for adequate federal or state legislation. If a will clearly indicates how
estate taxes are to be paid, as to both probate and nonprobate assets
which might be includible in the testator's gross estate, his expression
of intent will be given full effect and his testamentary scheme will not
be distorted because of uncertain conflict of laws rules.86
MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS
Gifts
Few conflict of laws rules are as well-settled as those relating to
choice of law to determine the validity of an inter vivos conveyance of
land: the law of the situs is controlling.87 This usually means that the
law of the jurisdiction where land is located resolves the validity of an at-
tempted inter vivos gift. However, Ohio is one of several states having
a statute which validates conveyances of local land if the deed con-
forms to the law of the place of execution.' For example, if the donor
attempts to make a gift of Ohio land by executing a deed in Illinois, the
gift will be effective in Ohio if the conveyance satisfies the laws of
either Ohio or Illinois."9
Inter vivos gifts of movables give rise to more intricate conflict of
laws problems. According to the early common law, movables had no
"locality" because they followed their owner, and therefore, the law of
the donor's domicile determined the validity of an inter vivos gift °0
84 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
131-32, 219-26 (1958).
85 Scoles & Stephens, supra note 76.
86 See, e.g., Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 318 Mass. 563, 62
N.E.2d 831 (1945) (testator's intent may be implied); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v.
Suydam, 125 N.J. Eq. 458, 6 A.2d 392 (Ch. 1939) (effect given to testamentary expression of
intent) ; It re Jeffery's Estate, 333 Pa. 15, 3 A.2d 393 (1939) (effect given to expression
of intent in inter vivos trust instrument).
87 McGoon v. Scales, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 23 (1869); United States v. Crosby, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 114 (1812); Thompson v. Kyle, 39 Fla. 582, 23 So. 12 (1897); Cook,
"'Immovables' and the 'Law' of the 'Situs,'" 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1246 (1939).
88 Ohio Rev. Code § 5301.06 (1953). See also Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 47-7 (1958);
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 30, § 22 (1959) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 26.528 (1953) ; Wis. Stat. § 235.22
(Supp 1962).
89 See Carney v. Hopple's Heirs, 17 Ohio St. 36 (1867); 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws
§ 8.1 (1935) ; Dicey, Conflict of Laws 59 (6th ed. 1949).
90 See Nichols v. Mase, 94 N.Y. 160 (1883); Farmers & Mechanics Nat'l Bank v.
Loftus, 133 Pa. 97, 19 At. 347 (1890) ; Cheshire, Private International Law 559 (3d ed.
1947) ; Story, Conflict of Laws 379-80, 390 (5th ed. 1857).
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Recent cases have rejected these notions, and today the forum normally
applies the law of the situs of the subject matter at the time of transfer,
regardless of whether the subject matter is "tangible" or "intangible." 9'
It must be conceded that there is little basis in fact for holding that
movables have no locality and follow their owner, but there is at least
one instance where it might be appropriate to apply the law of the
donor's domicile. A gift causa mortis is partially an inter vivos transfer
and partially a disposition of property upon death; inter vivos delivery
is necessary, but the gift is "revoked" if the donor survives his con-
templated illness.92 Since such gifts are made in contemplation of death
and the donee's title does not become irrevocable until the donor dies,
it is at least arguable that the conflicts rule should recognize such gifts
as a disposition of property upon death. Succession to movables is gen-
erally governed by the law of the decedent's domicile at the time of
his death,9 3 and the validity of a gift causa mortis should be tested by
the same rule. This argument has been accepted by some courts,94 but
the prevailing view characterizes such gifts as basically inter vivos in
nature, and the law of the situs at the time of transfer is applied rather
than that of the decedent's domicile at the time of death.95
Bank Accounts
With surprising uniformity the courts have held that the validity
and effect of a joint bank account, or a bank account in the depositor's
name as trustee for another, are to be determined by the law of the
place where the bank is located.96 While this conclusion may be justi-
fied as a matter of commercial convenience and most contacts do in fact
center around the bank, the rationale to be used is somewhat uncer-
91 United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 293 U.S. 340 (1934) (intangible); Warner
v. Florida Bank & Trust Co., 160 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1947) (intangible); Weissman v.
Banque de Bruxelles, 254 N.Y. 488, 173 N.E. 835 (1930) (intangible); Goetschius v.
Brightman, 245 N.Y. 186, 156 N.E. 660 (1927) (tangible). But cf. Morson v. Second
Nat'l Bank, 306 Mass. 588, 29 N.E.2d 19 (1940); Gidden v. Gidden, 176 Miss. 93, 167
So. 785 (1936).
92 See Brown, Personal Property §§ 52, 55 (2d ed. 1955).
93 See materials cited note 23 supra.
9- Gidden v. Gidden, supra note 91 (semble); Re Craven's Estate [19371 3 All
E.R. 33 (Ch.).
95 O'Neil v. First Nat'l Bank, 43 Mont. 505, 117 Pac. 889 (1911) ; Emery v. Clough,
63 N.H. 552, 4 AtI. 796 (1885); it re Korvine's Trusts, [19211 1 Ch. 343; Lalive, The
Transfer of Chattels in the Conflict of Laws 26-29 (1955); Restatement § 254a.
96 Delaney v. Eddy, 188 F. Supp. 780 (D. Mass. 1960); Cutts v. Najdrowski, 123
N.J. Eq. 481, 198 AtI. 885 (E. & A. 1938) ; Wynne v. Wynne, 69 R.I. 229,33 A.2d 173 (1943);
Sloan v. Jones, 192 Tenn. 400, 241 S.W.2d 506 (1951); Boyle v. Kempkin, 243 Wis. 86,
9 N.W.2d 589 (1943). Contra, In re Weinsteins' Estate, 176 Misc. 592, 28 N.Y.S.2d 137
(Surr. Ct. 1941).
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tain. Some courts have concluded that a contract was executed be-
tween the bank and the depositor and the situs of the bank is the
place where the contract was made and to be performed. 7 Other cases
have treated a joint bank account as an attempt to make an inter vivos
gift, thus calling for application of the law of the place where the trans-
fer was made.9 In cases involving deposits "in trust" for the benefit of
the depositor or another, the location of the bank has been considered to
be the domicile of the trustee and the situs of the trust corpus. 99 Since
these several paths lead to a reasonable conclusion, the one selected is
perhapi of little consequence.
Insurance
Most questions relating to life insurance policies issued by legal
reserve companies are resolved by applying the law of the place where
the contract was made, which is usually held to be the state where the
applicant was domiciled when the policy was delivered.' 0 The law of
the place of making has been applied to resolve the following issues:
insurable interest,' the right to change beneficiary," 2 the method for
changing beneficiary, 1 3 and interpretation of the terms designating
beneficiary. 4 Even though these cases continue to speak in terms of
traditional contract rules, life insurance is recognized as a contract of
97 In re Kugel's Estate, 192 Misc. 61, 78 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Surr. Ct. 1948); Sloan v.
Jones, supra note 96.
98 Kelly v. Kelly, 134 N.J. Eq. 316, 35 A.2d 618 (Prerog. Ct. 1944).
99 Boyle v. Kempkin, supra note 96.
100 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Simon, 151 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Gray v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 178 Tenn. 88, 156 S.W.2d 391 (1941); Carnahan, Conflict of Laws
and Life Insurance Contracts §§ 15, 43 (2d ed. 1958); Restatement (Second), Conflict
of Laws § 346h (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
101 Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. Whiteside, 94 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1938); Gray v. Penn
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 5 Ill. App. 2d 541, 126 N.E.2d 409 (1955); Western Life Indem. Co.
v. Rupp, 147 Ky. 489, 144 S.W. 743 (1912), aff'd, 235 U.S. 261 (1914).
102 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Walls, 124 F. Supp. 38 (N.D. W. Va. 1954);
Continental Assur. Co. v. Conroy, 111 F. Supp. 370 (D.N.J. 1953).
103 See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Haack, 50 F. Supp. 55 (W.D. La. 1943);
Hoskins v. Hoskins, 231 Ky. 5, 20 S.W.2d 1029 (1929).
104 Knights Templars & Masonic Mut. Aid Ass'n v. Greene, 79 Fed. 461 (C.C.S.D.
Ohio 1897); Plaut v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 16 Ohio C.C. Dec. 499 (1899); Goodrich,
Conflict of Laws § 112 (3d ed. 1949). Professor Carnahan has suggested that distribution
of proceeds payable to the insured's "estate" should be governed by the law of the
insured's domicile at the time of death, rather than by the laws of his domicile when the
contract was made. Carnahan, op. cit. supra note 100, § 69. In Knights Templars & Masonic
Mut. Aid Ass'n v. Greene, supra at 465, the court applied the law of the place of con-
tracting to interpret the word "heirs," but commented that ". . . the language is to be
treated as of a testamentary character, and is to receive, as nearly as possible, the same
construction as if used in a will under the same circumstances."
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adhesion and the courts tend to apply traditional rules in such a way as
to select the law of a state which is most favorable to the insured, pro-
vided that state has substantial contact with the policy involved. 105
This attitude is best illustrated by comparing cases where a choice of
law clause in the policy is enforced if it calls for application of law
which is favorable to the insured," 6 with cases where the clause is
ignored or held to be invalid if it requires application of the law of a
state which gives the insured less protection than he would enjoy under
the law of another appropriate jurisdiction. 1 7
The choice of law rule applied in cases of fraternal benefit insur-
ance policies is not nearly as flexible. Most questions relating to the
rights of individual members in the benefit association are determined
by the law of the state where the association is organized.'0" The Su-
preme Court has added its support to this rule by holding that the full
faith and credit clause compels this result in many instances.0 9 By
applying the law of the state of organization, the insured is protected
in the sense that the rights of each individual member are uniform and
relatively stable. However, this rule provides maximum protection for
the insured only if it is assumed that the internal law of the state of
organization is so designed. If we accept the proposition that conflict
of laws rules should favor the insured under his contract of adhesion, it
is perhaps regrettable that the flexibility evident in cases involving legal
reserve companies has been restricted when a fraternal benefit policy
is in issue.
CONCLUSION
There are three primary methods whereby an estate planner may
partially or completely control conflict of laws problems. The first is a
careful drafting of all inter vivos and testamentary instruments so as to
satisfy the law of all states having some present or potential contact
with the transaction. This possibility has greatest utility in regard to
105 Carnahan, op. cit. supra note 100, § 60; Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws
§ 346h, comment a (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
100 Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics' Say. Bank & Trust Co., 72 Fed. 413 (6th
Cir. 1896); Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Lovelace, 1 Ga. App. 446, 58 S.E. 93 (1907);
Jones v. New York Life Ins. Co., 32 Okla. 339, 122 Pac. 702 (1912).
107 See, e.g., New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olin, 114 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1940);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mullen, 107 Md. 457, 69 Aft. 385 (1908).
108 Kendrick v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 57 Ariz. 458, 103 P.2d 463 (1945); Styles
v. Byrne, 89 Mont. 243, 296 Pac. 577 (1931); Modem Woodmen of America v. Myers,
99 Ohio St. 87, 124 N.E. 48 (1918).
109 Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947); Sovereign
Camp v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938); Modem Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S.
544 (1925); Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915).
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avoiding formal defects when drafting wills and deeds. The second
method for avoiding conflicts problems is to locate assets so as to re-
duce the number of contacts with different states. The location of
assets is frequently beyond the control of the estate planner, and in
many instances is practically infeasible or financially inadvisable.
Nevertheless, this appears to be the only effective device for avoiding
the perplexing problem of double taxation of intangible personal prop-
erty. The third possibility is to add an express choice of law clause to
any inter vivos or testamentary instrument. In many of the areas con-
sidered in this study, the courts have expressed a willingness to apply
the law of the state designated in the instrument involved, providing
the state selected has some substantial connection with the transaction
and the law of that state does not violate some strong public policy of
the state to which reference would be made under the common-law
rules. The most significant areas where the courts have given effect to
a private selection of governing law are: inter vivos and testamentary
trusts and powers of appointment of movables, testamentary disposi-
tions of movables, allocation of federal estate taxes, and life in-
surance. Even in cases where the transaction does not fall within one
of these categories, it is advisable for the draftsman of any inter vivos
or testamentary instrument to include a clause which expressly selects
governing law from among those states having some reasonable con-
nection with the transaction.
